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Abstract
The progress of markets erodes traditional relations of social solidarity that are essential 
for the stability and performance of societies. As markets advance, pressures build on the 
state to replace informal social obligations with formal ones. Regulation may fail, however, 
which tends to give rise to demands for public services substituting for private reciprocity and 
compliance with institutionalized normative expectations. As a result, demands on public 
finances increase. The paper demonstrates this sequence by describing how the pressures and 
attractions of labor markets undermined the “Fordist family” of the 1960s; how the complex 
interaction between increasingly more flexible employment and loosening family structures 
resulted in declining fertility in a variety of modern societies; and how providing for societies’ 
physical reproduction increasingly became a matter of public policy in some countries but 
not in others. Parallels are drawn to active labor market policy and the recent rescue of the 
money-making industry by Western governments. Moreover, special attention is paid to dif-
ferences between countries, especially Sweden on the one hand and the United States on the 
other, in particular to the conditions under which governments apparently can afford not to 
heed calls for ever deeper and ever more expensive intervention in social relations. Exploring 
the increasingly negative relationship between fertility and “familialism,” the paper also shows 
how advanced commodification of labor and individualization of social life has effectively 
made it impossible to return to traditional social arrangements, such as the postwar family. 
Zusammenfassung
Mit der Ausbreitung von Märkten zerfallen traditionale solidarische Beziehungen, die für so-
ziale Stabilität und das Funktionieren von Gesellschaften von Bedeutung sind. Damit nimmt 
der Druck auf den Staat zu, informelle Verpflichtungen durch formelle zu ersetzen. Staatliche 
Regulierung sozialen Handelns stößt jedoch auf Grenzen. Die Folge sind Forderungen an 
den Staat, den Ausfall privater Reziprozität und mangelnde Befolgung formalisierter Ver-
haltenserwartungen durch Bereitstellung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen zu kompensieren. Als 
Ergebnis wachsen die Ansprüche der Gesellschaft an die staatlichen Finanzen. Das Papier 
verfolgt diese Sequenz am Beispiel der Auflösung des „Fordistischen“ Familienmodells der 
1960er Jahre unter dem Druck sowohl der Zwänge als auch der Attraktivität zunehmend of-
fener, deregulierter Arbeitsmärkte. Es zeigt, wie die komplexe Interaktion zwischen flexible-
rer Beschäftigung und lockereren Familienstrukturen zu einem Rückgang der Geburtenraten 
in verschiedenen modernen Gesellschaften führte und wie als Folge die physische Reproduk-
tion der Gesellschaft in einigen, aber nicht in allen Ländern zu einem legitimen Gegenstand 
öffentlicher Politik wurde. Das Papier verweist auf Parallelen mit der aktiven Arbeitsmarkt-
politik und der kürzlichen Rettung der Geldindustrie durch die westlichen Regierungen. Da-
bei zeigen sich erhebliche Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen Ländern, wie den USA und 
Schweden, vor allem in Bezug auf das Ausmaß, in dem es den Regierungen möglich ist, Rufe 
nach immer tieferen und immer teureren Interventionen in soziale Verhältnisse zu ignorie-
ren. Das Papier zeigt ferner anhand des zunehmend negativen Zusammenhangs zwischen 
Fertilität und einer „familialistischen“ Kultur und Sozialpolitik, wie die fortgeschrittene 
Kommodifizierung der Arbeit und die Individualisierung des sozialen Lebens eine Rückkehr 
zu traditionalen sozialen Arrangements, insbesondere der Familie, zunehmend ausschließt.
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Different parts of this paper were presented as lectures or seminars at the London School of Eco-
nomics (LSE; March 12, 2009), the Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien (DIJ; June 2, 2009), and 
Harvard University (July 26, 2009). I am indebted to Alexander Schüller and Daniel Mertens for 
indefatigable assistance with the compilation of the statistical data.
Free markets can be demanding on societies, and this in turn can be expensive for gov-
ernments. The spread of markets undermines traditional social obligations and com-
munal ways of life, draining important sources of social integration and stability. This is 
why capitalist market economies tend to generate a continuous stream of demands for 
social reconstruction by public policy. Relations of solidarity that become defunct with 
the advance of markets call for replacement with functionally equivalent public institu-
tions; formal regulation must substitute for informal social control; mutual confidence 
needs to be restored where traditional self-restraint has eroded; and emerging new risks 
require containment and insurance by public authority.
Far from making the state disappear, capitalist progress continuously gives rise to new 
pressures for political compensation of its adverse side-effects on social life, and indeed 
on economic life as well. Instead of withering away, modern states seem to be experienc-
ing a growing gap between a growing demand for reconstructive political intervention 
and the limited resources that a private economy and a free society are willing to concede 
to them to pay for it. In fact, a driving force behind political-economic liberalization in 
the past two decades seems to have been attempts of governments to defend their capac-
ity to govern by returning responsibility for coping with the consequences of market 
expansion to societies and markets themselves. If nothing else, the current financial 
crisis is making states and governments face the central political question of how they 
can satisfy increasing demands for public intervention with the limited means they have 
available, and which social dysfunctions generated by an expanding capitalist market 
economy they can afford not to address. Which claims for reconstructive social surgery 
by public provision can governments fend off without causing unacceptable risks for 
political and social stability? What are the likely consequences of states being unable or 
unwilling to intervene in societies and economies in response to the socially destructive 
side-effects of expanding markets? And what are the conditions under which states can 
stand back and leave it to their societies and economies to deal with the social repercus-
sions of markets and capitalism on their own?
Exploring the relationship between expanding markets, changing social structures and 
political intervention, the present paper looks at the way in which the physical repro-
duction of society has or has not become a subject of public policy in the course of the 
accelerated commodification of labor in the past two decades and the simultaneous 
transformation of the postwar family. It begins by recounting the advance of labor mar-
ket flexibility after the 1970s; the political attempts to make that advance compatible 
with individual security and social stability; and the laissez-faire default option, which 
is acceptance of social and economic dualism. Next, it asks why the destruction of the 
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postwar standard employment relationship met with so little resistance, suggesting that 
one reason was that the rise of flexible employment was intertwined in various ways 
with a transition to more flexible families. The paper discusses how the two develop-
ments – intensified commodification of labor, in particular the increased labor market 
participation of women, and the de-institutionalization of family relations – may re-
late to the secular decline of fertility in advanced industrial societies, and how this has 
tended to make the production of children a public responsibility in some countries but 
not in others. 
To illustrate the multifaceted nature and the inherent complexity of the relationship be-
tween markets, families, social performance and public policy, and to identify issues for 
further, in-depth research, the paper compares the very different experiences of three 
countries in particular, social-democratic Sweden, the free-market United States, and 
Christian-democratic Germany. Among other things, it casts doubt on the now appar-
ently received belief that government family policies can effectively improve reproduc-
tive performance, also in comparison to the market-based alternative way of combining 
high fertility with high female labor market participation that one sees in the United 
States. It also explores the paradoxically negative impact of the persistence of traditional 
family structures on fertility as seen, for example, in Italy and Japan. 
Finally, the paper concludes with general observations on the costs of markets to so-
cieties and states. Active labor market policy and the new family policies in various 
European countries are discussed as attempts by governments to deploy public policy 
and public funds to create substitutes for embedded and instituted social solidarity sub-
verted by the progress of marketization. Similar pressures for political compensation of 
the effects of markets on social structures and their performance were at work in the 
current financial crisis, which used up public funds at an unprecedented scale to bal-
ance potentially crippling dysfunctions of progressive marketization. The paper raises 
the question of how long governments will be able to afford transferring solidarity from 
an increasingly market-driven society to public budgets.
1 Flexible employment
The rise of flexibility as a paramount concern in industrial relations and labor market 
policy began with the decay of the postwar settlement in the 1970s (on the following 
see Streeck 2008b). As the Wirtschaftswunder, the trentes glorieuses, the “Golden Age” of 
the postwar boom faded, the advance of mass production became stuck, and the global 
monetary regime with the United States as benevolent hegemon broke apart, flexibility 
began its ascent as a leading objective in the organization of labor markets and employ-
ment, as reflected in a rapid increase in the number of articles on the subject in profes-
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sional journals (Figure 1).1 After first appearing in the 1970s, the concept took off in the 
subsequent decade, and finally became dominant in the second half of the 1990s. As-
suming a time span of roughly half a decade between the discovery of a research topic 
and the publication of first results, the career of flexibility by and large coincided with 
the historical period during which, according to Andrew Glyn, capitalism once again 
became “unleashed” (Glyn 2006).
For a while, different versions of flexibility coexisted and indeed competed with one an-
other. When employers and governments began to ask workers to allow them more flex-
ibility and become more flexible themselves, a typical response in countries with strong 
unions and a broad skill base, such as Germany, was to offer functional, or internal, flex-
ibility in lieu of numerical, or external, flexibility (Streeck 1987). In other words, work-
ers were willing to switch jobs inside their existing workplace on the condition that they 
were guaranteed continued employment in one form or another, and that employers 
provided them with the required additional training. Other proposals to avoid external 
flexibility included more variable working time arrangements, such as yearly working 
time accounts, and even variable pay. Ultimately, however, all of this seems to have been 
to no avail. Functional flexibility may have delayed, but could not prevent the arrival of 
1 This diagram and the next present the results of a search of data bases such as SocIndex, Busi-
ness Source Premier and Econlit using EBSCOhost. 
Figure 1 “Flexibility“ in professional journals  
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numerical flexibility – either because its potential was exhausted too soon, or because 
employers resented the additional efforts, organizational and otherwise, that it required 
them to undertake, or because of declining trade union power. The way in which flex-
ibility, in the end, came down to a massive re-opening of external labor markets is again 
reflected in the literature, where a steep decline in the number of articles dealing with 
functional flexibility was paralleled by the late 1990s by continually increasing interest 
in numerical flexibility (Figure 2).
Functional flexibility as a socially benevolent alternative to numerical flexibility was as-
sociated with “Model Japan” or “Model Germany.” However, neither of these survived 
the 1990s and the increasingly successful attempts by employers to escape from the 
social obligations inherited from the 1970s. The success of the worldwide effort to de-
regulate employment at the end of the century is reflected by the index of the Overall 
Strictness of Employment Protection Law that the OECD began to calculate in 1990 
(Table 1). For the nine selected countries that are of particular interest here, the average 
value of that index fell from 2.3 in 1990 to 1.9 in 1998, and further to 1.7 in 2003 and 
2006. With external flexibility having eventually prevailed over internal flexibility, new 
national models emerged in Europe that stood for alternative ways for public policy 
to make the increased commodification of labor socially acceptable, in particular the 
Netherlands and Denmark. It is in one of these countries that the latest lead concept 
Figure 2 Types of “flexibility“
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in labor market policy was invented: flexicurity. Its first appearance in the newspapers 
dates from the late 1990s in both the English and the German press; from 2004 on, it 
became firmly established as a topic of public interest (Figure 3). A little later, with the 
usual time lag, flexicurity also became current in scholarly journals.2
As has often been noted, it is not easy to say what flexicurity really means (Viebrock/
Clasen 2009) – which makes it ideally suited for all sorts of rhetoric. In light of its 
origins, we may broadly define it as a form of social security, or protection of social 
stability, that is intended to be compatible with high turnover and mobility in external 
labor markets. It may also be described as a set of public policies designed to replace 
employment security with job security – guaranteeing workers not a given job in a given 
place of employment, but some job in some place of employment, and if necessary, a 
rapid succession of jobs. In its more euphemistic self-advertisements, flexicurity aims to 
replace “old,” “outdated” forms of social security with “new,” more “modern” ones that 
are allegedly better adjusted to the assumed “needs” of a more competitive and faster-
changing economy – with institutions designed to support and embrace rather than 
prevent more intensive commodification of labor while, it is promised, still protecting 
workers from the uncertainties associated with it.
Be this as it may, while it is clear that flexicurity involves the dismantling of old forms of 
protection for workers, there is still much debate and experimentation on what should 
take their place. The only thing we know for certain is that where flexicurity is intended 
to mean more than just flexibility, social security systems have to maintain workers at 
public expense during the frequent if short and temporary spells of unemployment they 
are expected to accept for the benefit of economic progress. Denmark, where flexicur-
ity seems most advanced, is exemplary in this regard. There is hardly any employment 
protection in Denmark – at least by continental European standards – which allows 
employers to hire and fire their workers freely “at will,” making the Danish labor market 
more market-like than any other labor market on the European Continent. At the same 
2 EBSCO host registers 16 scholarly articles on the subject from 2001–2005, and 58 in 2006 and 
2007. In other databases, the take-off year for articles on flexicurity is 2005.
Table 1 Overall strictness of employment protection law
 1990 1998 2003 2006
Denmark 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.4
France 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0
Germany 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.2
Italy 3.6 2.7 1.9 1.9
Japan 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8
Netherlands 2.7 2.1 2.1 1.9
Sweden 3.5 2.2 2.2 2.2
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
United States 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Average 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.7
Source: OECD.
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time, unemployment benefits are high, offering workers income security in compensa-
tion for little if any job security. Moreover, since high rates of income replacement pose 
what economists call a “moral hazard,” the government must have the capacity to make 
workers take almost any job that is offered to them, regardless of pay and location. 
This requires a powerful and expensive labor market bureaucracy, one that not only 
has complete information about job openings but also commands effective means to 
sanction unemployed workers who are unwilling to return to the labor market when 
told to do so. 
It is not surprising, then, that in 2003 the Danish state had to spend an unequaled 4.6 
percent of the country’s gross domestic product on labor market policy. About three 
percentage points went into unemployment benefits, while the rest covered the costs of 
so-called “active” policies, mostly training and job referral. The other home country of 
flexicurity, the Netherlands, ranked second in spending among OECD countries, at 3.6 
percent. Note that the UK and the United States, the two countries classically associated 
with flexibility uncompensated by politically provided security – with solidarity vested, 
if at all, in informal private communities rather than formal public institutions – spent 
no more than 0.8 and 0.7 percent of their GDP, respectively, on labor market policy. 
This was roughly as much as Japan (0.7 percent), the traditional country of functional 
flexibility, where the costs of employment stability are, or used to be, absorbed by em-
ployers (Eichhorst et al. 2004: 218). 
Figure 3 “Flexicurity“ in the press
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Labor market reform in the 1990s was not intended to increase public spending on so-
cial security; in fact, in most countries the opposite was the case. This may be the most 
important reason why flexicurity remained no more than a slogan in most countries and 
why the meaning of the second element of the concept – for which the “curity” part of 
the term stands – has remained so vague. In any case, what can be observed is that labor 
market reform in most countries consisted not of a general shift from old to new forms 
of employment security, but simply of an expansion of “precarious,” “atypical,” non-stan-
dard employment on the fringes of national labor market regimes. The extent to which 
this was the case can be seen if we calculate the OECD Strictness of Protection Index sep-
arately for regular and temporary employment (Table 2). Looking at differences between 
1990 and 2006, in the case of regular employment we find on average no change at all for 
our nine countries, with a decline in just one country balanced by an increase in three 
countries. In the case of temporary employment, by comparison, protection declined in 
no less than six countries, with an average decline for all nine countries of 1.1 units.
From the perspective of governments, labor market reform and the increased external 
flexibility it conceded to employers was intended above all to raise the general level of 
participation in paid employment while reducing unemployment and dependence on 
social assistance. In most countries this worked, but in many only at the price of a dra-
matic increase in precarious employment. The result was a new dualism (Berger/Piore 
1980) in labor markets that came to be characteristic of employment systems almost 
Table 2 Change in strictness of regulation of regular employment   
and of temporary employment, 1990–2006 
 Regular employment Temporary employment 
Denmark 0.0 –1.7
France +0.2 +0.5
Germany +0.1 –2.0
Italy 0.0 –3.3
Japan 0.0 –0.5
Netherlands –0.5 –1.2
Sweden 0.0 –2.5
United Kingdom +0.2 +0.1
United States 0.0 0.0
Average 0.0 –1.1
Source: OECD.
Table 3 Germany: Atypical employment, in percent
 Part-time* Marginal* Temporary* Total
1997 11.7 4.5 6.3 17.5
1999 13.0 5.9 7.4 19.7
2001 13.9 6.1 7.0 20.1
2003 15.3 6.7 6.8 21.2
2005 16.2 8.4 8.3 23.4
2007 16.4 9.2 8.8 25.5
* Categories may overlap.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008: Atypische Beschäftigung 
auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt, Wiesbaden; own calculations.
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everywhere in the formerly corporatist countries of Western Europe – with flexibility 
achieved not by the publicly compensated removal of “rigid” protections from incum-
bents in the primary sector, but by assigning newcomers to a deregulated marginal, sec-
ondary sector. In the German case, for example, vitally needed gains in employment were 
made possible through a policy of “activation,” involving the deregulation of part-time, 
marginal and temporary jobs and more effective work incentives for individuals previ-
ously shielded from market pressures, in the form of shortened unemployment benefits 
and fewer opportunities for early retirement. Also, which is particularly relevant in the 
present context, single mothers had often been excused from having to take a job, and 
were awarded comparatively generous social assistance; this also was sharply curtailed.
As protective regulations were cut back, the result was a sharp rise in atypical employ-
ment in the decade between 1997 and 2007, from 17.5 to 25.5 percent of the workforce 
(Table 3). This was closely associated with steadily increasing employment of women, 
which paralleled developments in all other countries of the OECD world (Table 4). 
Female employment grew especially in the years after 2005, when the labor market 
reforms of the second Schröder government began to take effect. (Male participation 
rates had slowly declined over the period but picked up again after 2005.) Importantly, 
average working hours for women fell sharply after the 1970s, much more so than for 
men, indicating that the increase in female participation took place largely in the form 
of part-time work and only against resistance – on the part of incumbents in the estab-
lished employment regime as well as, probably, of women hesitant to commit fully to 
paid work in formal employment.
In Germany as in many other countries, expansion of employment and the correspond-
ing decline in unemployment was accomplished to a large extent not by a new social 
policy that compensated individuals and society for the intensified commodification of 
labor, but by refusing social protection to outsiders and newcomers in the labor mar-
ket – protections which had in the past deterred employers from taking on new work-
ers while enabling workers to reject offers of what were then considered unacceptable 
Table 4 Germany: Rate of economic activity and weekly working hours, men and women 
 Rate of economic activity Average weekly working hours
 Men Women Men Women
1970 87.7 45.9 45.2 39.2
1975 83.1 46.4 42.2 35.9
1980 82.5 48.3 42.4 35.2
1985 76.3 47.0 41.4 34.4
1990 78.5 53.8 40.7 31.9
1995 74.7 55.1 40.8 33.1
2000 74.3 57.7 40.6 29.8
2005 73.3 59.5 38.2 27.9
2006 74.5 61.4 38.3 27.8
2007 76.0 63.1 37.9 27.6
Source: Economic Activity: Statistisches Bundesamt; Working hours: Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozial-
ordnung. 1990 and earlier: West Germany.
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forms of employment. While liberalization allowed employers more external flexibility 
in their use of labor, it imposed on a growing number of employees, in particular those 
not yet established in the protected primary sector, a significant increase in uncertainty 
about working time, pay, future employment, and career perspectives. Rising employ-
ment generated by more flexible labor markets coincided with a sharp rise in unstable 
and low-wage employment and, subsequently, in poverty – not in the core but in a 
Figure 4 Germany in the OECD: Income inequality and poverty
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Since 2000, income inequality and poverty have grown faster in Germany than in any other 
OECD country. They increased by more in five years (2000–2005) than in the previous fifteen 
combined (1985–2000).
Source: OECD, 2008: Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, Country Note: 
Germany.
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growing fringe of the employment system and of society.3 Looking again at the German 
case, while until the late 1980s, (West) Germany was widely known for having a low 
wage spread and a low Gini coefficient, especially for a large country, in the early 2000s 
it rapidly closed the gap to the OECD average (Figure 4). Moreover, income poverty, 
which had also been comparatively low, began to grow as well in the early 1990s until in 
the middle of the present decade it, too, equaled the OECD average, which was also ris-
ing. Whereas in Denmark, high turnover in a flexible external labor market seems to be 
compatible with high and relatively equal wages for all, albeit at high public expense, in 
Germany, where equality had in the past been achieved by publicly subsidized low activ-
ity (Streeck 2001), cutbacks in social policy spending caused a widening gap between the 
low and the high end of the labor market and a growing division in German society.
2 Flexible families
Labor market liberalization involved a profound redefinition of the meaning of social 
and economic citizenship: from public protection from the market to public activa-
tion for the market, combined, perhaps, with public assistance within it. Clearly this 
must be why the departure from the standard employment relationship proceeded at 
such different speeds in different countries. Still, it went surprisingly smoothly overall, 
considering that the standard employment relationship had been the principal protec-
tion of workers and their communities against the volatility of free markets, and that 
it had been only in exchange for such protection that the market economy came to be 
accepted by the organized working class of the postwar era. 
Certainly in part, the ease of the transition was due to the fact that it proceeded only 
gradually and, at least initially, left the core of the employment regime untouched. But 
this can be only half the answer. Institutionalist accounts of labor market flexibility 
tend to forget that the standard employment relationship of the postwar era supported 
a particular social structure that had emerged together with it, which was a contem-
porary variant of the nuclear family. How closely the new type of family was related to 
the production system of the “Golden Age” is reflected by the fact that it retrospectively 
came to be called the “Fordist family,” referring to a stable union of husband and wife, 
with the husband as the single earner and the wife taking care of two or more children. 
Materially the Fordist family was sustained by a “family wage” that, along with vari-
ous welfare state benefits, was enough to secure a decent standard of living for all its 
3 How core and fringe relate to one another under the new dualism may be regarded as an open 
question. In the past, the existence of a secondary sector was often seen, famously by Berger and 
Piore (1980), as functional for the stability of the primary sector. Today it may rather seem that 
the emergence of a growing fringe tends to undermine the institutions regulating the core, and 
indeed to eat into it (Streeck 2009).
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members. Stable employment was an essential ingredient of this package and indeed a 
central pillar of the newly settled way of life sought by men as they returned from the 
battlefields, as well as by women coming home from the armaments factories or the 
military hospitals (Judt 2005). Very soon, one of the emblems of postwar civilization 
became the “baby boom” of the late 1950s and the 1960s.
Obviously the Fordist family was, in current jargon, highly “gendered,” and this is why 
already at the time of its invention the concept had a more than slightly derogatory con-
notation. Keynes had once defined full employment as less than five percent of males 
between 18 and 65 being out of work. Women were not mentioned, since they were as-
sumed as a matter of course to be in the house and to provide for their families outside 
the market. It was this world of stable patriarchal families in integrated social commu-
nities that someone like Karl Polanyi would have expected to be defended by what he 
believed was an inevitable “counter-movement” against more than marginal commodi-
fication of the fictitious commodity, labor (Polanyi 1957 [1944]). In the view of Polanyi 
and many of his contemporaries, human beings needed and wanted the security that 
was offered by a stable society, an indispensible element of which was stable families. 
Figure 5 Divorces per 1,000 inhabitants
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Since such security was incompatible with permanently changing relative prices in self-
regulating markets, for labor as well as for its products, a good life for the great major-
ity of people presupposed strong institutions that contained the impact of markets on 
social life and protected individuals and their families from the destructive dynamism 
of a modern capitalist economy.
Why was it, then, that no significant resistance arose to stem the trend toward more flex-
ible employment? Searching for an answer one notes that the social and family structure 
that the standard employment relationship had once underwritten has itself dissolved 
in a process of truly revolutionary change.4 In fact, it appears that the Fordist family was 
replaced by a flexible family in much the same way as Fordist employment was replaced 
by flexible employment, during the same period and also all across the Western world. 
A few select indicators must suffice here. Divorce rates (Figure 5) increased everywhere 
after the end of the postwar era until they stabilized, at a much higher level, in the mid-
1980s. Exceptions were low-divorce countries like Italy and Japan, where the increase 
4 The following draws on and expands the argument in Streeck (2008a).
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continued, and the United States, where divorce has always been extremely frequent 
and where it started to decline around 1980. (Still, divorce rates in the United States – 
incidentally the classical country of “employment at will” – have remained by far the 
highest in the world.) Moreover, new marriages declined during the same period until 
the ratio of marriages over divorces converged in six of our seven countries, at roughly 
2:1 in the middle of the present decade (Figure 6).5 
As marriage declined, cohabitation increasingly took its place. In Germany, statistics on 
cohabitation, which had not been considered worth collecting before 1978, show an in-
crease in the percentage of unmarried couples by a factor of more than six in roughly a 
quarter of a century, from 2 percent in 1978 to 13 percent in 2005 (Statistisches Bundes-
amt, own calculations). Since the denominator of the relationship includes all couples, 
young and old, cohabitation among the younger generation can be assumed to be much 
5 An exception is Italy, where divorce is still rare, having been not legally possible until well into 
the 1970s, and to an extent Japan.
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more widespread. Simultaneously, births to unmarried parents, which were very rare 
outside Scandinavia until the 1980s, increased dramatically in almost all countries, from 
an average in 1970 of 7.5 percent of newborns in our seven countries to no less than 
33 percent in 2005 (Figure 7). As a consequence, single-parent families proliferated. In 
relatively conservative Germany, 27 percent of families with children were headed by a 
single parent or an unmarried couple in 2005, doubling the figure from the end of the 
1970s and, we may reasonably assume, much more than doubling that from the 1960s 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, own calculations). 
Finally, as family ties became progressively less institutionalized through the easier avail-
ability of divorce and growing social acceptance of cohabitation as a legitimate alternative 
to marriage, birth rates fell steeply. All over the Western world, the breakup of the Fordist 
family-cum-employment regime was accompanied by a rapid decline in the number of 
newborn children, a process that continued well after reliable contraception and legal 
abortion had first become available (Figure 8). Being easily the most lasting and least 
revocable social commitment people can make, having children seems to have appeared 
to a new generation as increasingly incompatible with the more flexible and unsettled life 
associated with both more market-driven employment and less binding social relations.
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3 Market attractions, market pressures
One explanation, then, for why flexible labor markets became tolerable after the end 
of the “Golden Age” – contradicting the Polanyian conjecture that the desire for social 
stability would impose tight limits on the commodification of labor – may be that soci-
ety, and in particular the family, had itself become more flexible. Cultural change – the 
spread of non-standard forms of social life – may have paved the way for economic and 
institutional change, in particular the rise of non-standard forms of employment, with 
the deregulation of society as a forerunner to the deregulation of the economy. In fact, 
it seems that the decay of the postwar family was already well under way before employ-
ers and economists began attacking the standard employment relationship in earnest. 
Note that the concept of liberalization may refer not just to an economic process, but 
also to a social and indeed cultural one, and that shedding social obligations may hold 
attractions not just for employers in labor markets, but also for individuals in families 
and communities. Cultural revolutions, like the one in Europe in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, do not necessarily require external causes, as there may be enough internal 
discontent inside a social order to make it change from within. What is deemed a good 
or appropriate life may change profoundly, not just between generations, but within 
them as well. 
In any case, transition to a more flexible labor market regime after the 1970s does not 
seem to have been obstructed much by resistance of ideas from the 1960s about a livable 
society. In fact such ideas seem to have given way with surprising ease to cultural ten-
dencies highly favorable to an expansion of markets, in particular the rise of attitudes 
and dispositions for which markets are as much an attraction as a threat. With fewer 
and less binding family obligations, living with less stability and more adventure seems 
to have become more acceptable in the worlds of work as well as employment. Causal 
relations are obviously highly complex and seem to work in both directions. The erosion 
of the standard employment relationship may have made family formation difficult for 
young people, just as it may offer an excuse for postponing or avoiding altogether entry 
into binding social commitments, such as marriage and childbearing, which in turn 
may make it less urgent to look for stable employment. Moreover, cultural definitions 
of what constitutes and is implied in social relations seem to be important background 
factors, as suggested by the astonishing parallels in rates of separation in marriage on 
the one hand and in employment on the other, over time as well as between countries 
like Japan, Germany and Italy versus the United Kingdom and the United States.
Clearly, the decisive development in this context was the mass entry of women into paid 
employment, which eventually came to be celebrated across the political spectrum as 
a long-overdue liberation from servitude in the feudal village of the patriarchal family. 
Especially for the liberal wing of the rapidly growing feminist movement, the associated 
increase in economic uncertainty and social instability appeared to be a price worth 
paying for what was seen as secular social progress. Commodification of labor, once 
perceived by the Left as a threat to the dignity of the individual and the stability of 
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society, became redefined as a desirable alternative to a repressive, pre-modern way of 
life, or at least a necessary answer to a new generation of men who could no longer be 
relied upon to accept traditional social obligations as husbands and heads of families. 
It remains a puzzling question how it was that cultural change favoring more flexible 
social relations and defining uncertainty as a welcome opportunity for personal growth 
and self-assertion happened just at a time when labor shortages and the resulting wage 
inflation seriously impeded further economic growth and made employers desperately 
search for ways of expanding the labor supply.
Economically and politically, female progress in employment had to be achieved in op-
position to the Fordist labor market regime, which was soon to be denounced by femi-
nist commentators as a male construction founded on female domesticity and subser-
vience. In Germany, where postwar labor market institutions were more resilient than 
elsewhere, it took time for the growing number of women attracted, according to the 
liberal-liberationist narrative, by the freedom of the market to wear down the institu-
tional barriers against employment expansion inherent in the family wage system and a 
male-breadwinner social security regime. Even here, however, rigid institutions protect-
ing the historical prerogative of males to sell their labor power for money, and sustain-
ing with it the established family system and its “gendered” division of labor, finally had 
to give. Of course, flexible labor markets open to all, expected to accommodate what 
was in effect a doubling of the labor supply, could no longer offer the same sort of se-
curity and stability as the labor markets of Fordism with their tightly restricted supply. 
Nor could they continue to pay one worker enough to feed an entire family. But women, 
the new enthusiastic constituency of open and competitive labor markets, were clearly 
less concerned about employment security than the sole breadwinners of yesteryear, 
and they certainly did not require a family wage given that, under the rule of the new 
individualism, they ideally had to take care of only themselves.
There is, however, another, alternative account of the simultaneous rise of flexible em-
ployment and flexible families. Whereas the liberationist story, embraced by feminists 
as well as by employers enthusiastic about the prospect of a massive increase in the 
labor supply, emphasizes the attractions of the market for the individual, the alterna-
tive, if you will: Polanyian account focuses on the pressures markets exert on society. 
According to it, beginning in the 1970s stagnant real wages and rising unemployment 
compelled households to supply more labor to the market to defend their accustomed 
standard of living. Eroding social protections and the declining efficacy of social rights, 
caused by intensified competition in product markets and mounting political offen-
sives by employers against the postwar labor regime, increasingly exposed workers and 
their families to market uncertainties. Consequently they found themselves forced to 
supplement single-earner incomes by married women taking up employment – part-
time where it was available – in order to cope with accelerating industrial restructur-
ing. A side effect was intensified wage competition and pressures on the conditions of 
employment – or, where these were successfully defended, a trend toward labor market 
dualism. Among the young generation, formation of stable family relations was post-
Streeck: Flexible Employment, Flexible Families, and the Socialization of Reproduction 21
poned or abandoned altogether as market uncertainty made entry into a settled life 
increasingly difficult. One result was and continues to be a growing number of unstable 
families and single mothers living near the poverty line. Indeed having children, espe-
cially more than one, became the most important cause of poverty for individuals as 
well as for families. Moreover, by the end of the century, rising costs of social protection 
forced reforms of the welfare state and the labor market designed to push as many of 
the unemployed as possible, including single mothers, into employment. As all sorts of 
“atypical,” flexible employment proliferated, so did the pressures on the standard em-
ployment relationship at the center of the employment regime.
I will only briefly touch on the question of whether and how the two accounts – of 
women pushed into employment by economic constraint and welfare reform, or pulled 
by the prospect of personal liberation – might be reconcilable. For example, while the 
market attractions narrative probably applies mostly at the top end of the social spec-
trum, the market pressure account is likely to reflect conditions at the bottom. What 
may be a welcome adventure for one – the exodus from the Fordist family into flexible 
markets for both employment and family relations – may be an unpleasant necessity 
for the other, caused by low wages or unstable family unions. One may also take the 
liberationist account to be an ideological representation of the structural constraints 
described by the market pressure or the family dissolution story. While ideologies do 
reflect reality, they do so selectively in ways that make it appear ideal or inevitable. A 
glorifying ideological representation of a flexible life and the freedom that comes with 
it may become hegemonic if the image it projects of the real world appears plausible 
and attractive to those who dominate public discourse. What may have started as mar-
ket pressure on households struggling to defend their living standards, or as increasing 
unreliability of family relations, may in this way gradually translate into a moral duty 
for women to seek paid employment and prove themselves by earning their living inde-
pendently in a competitive labor market.
In any case, although it is unlikely that the recommodification of labor after the end of 
the “Golden Age” was driven by a mass desire for economic adventure, the willingness 
to defend the postwar social order against the pressures and attractions of the market 
seems not to have been nearly as strong as someone like Polanyi might have expected. 
To many, escaping from the Fordist family was more important than defending the 
standard employment relationship, and their interests coincided in nontrivial ways with 
those of others who were keen on abolishing the latter for very different, economic pur-
poses. One reason why the labor market regime of the postwar settlement was vulner-
able not just economically and, as it were, from without, but also culturally and from 
within seems to have been the vulnerability of the culture it was supposed to protect 
to what Boltanski and Chiapello have called the “artistic critique” of industrial society 
(Boltanski/Chiapello 2005): the claim that life in that society offered little if any op-
portunity for individual autonomy and personal authenticity. “Artistic” discontent with 
life in the 1950s and 1960s prepared the way for the cultural megatrend of the second 
half of the twentieth century, individualization. In the process exit, or the option of exit, 
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became more highly valued than loyalty – which not only made for more flexible fami-
lies but apparently also made more acceptable an emerging employment regime that 
both required and offered more flexibility. At some point in the late 1960s, the prospect 
of spending one’s entire working life with the same employer in the same occupation 
seems to have begun to appear as confining as life-long monogamy.6 In this way, ascen-
dant individualism seems to have both allowed for and required a new quantum leap in 
the commodification of labor, with many more people than might have been expected 
turning out to be prepared to enjoy, or at least to know of no alternative to, a much 
more market-driven way of life as part and as a condition of individual autonomy.
4 The socialization of reproduction
A little later, in the ageing societies of the industrialized world, falling birth rates became 
a prominent subject of public concern and public policy. In the immediate postwar 
years, when children were born in large numbers, having children was considered in 
most countries to be a private affair. An exception was what was at the time the ultimate 
country of social engineering, social-democratic Sweden. Here, early state feminism 
went hand in hand with pronatalism and extensive eugenic intervention in reproduc-
tive behavior. In Germany, by contrast, Konrad Adenauer, Roman Catholic that he was, 
became famous for his dictum, “Kinder kriegen die Leute sowieso” (“people have chil-
dren anyway”). Later, in the 1970s, Helmut Schmidt held the view that “what people do 
in their bedrooms” had to be of no interest to the government. Clearly, this reflected 
the memory of Nazi population policies, which made pronatalist state policies taboo 
throughout the history of West Germany. Today, however, the number of children has 
become a highly salient political issue even in Germany – the universally accepted prin-
ciple being that having too few children is dangerous to the health of a society and that 
therefore the rate of births is a matter of legitimate and indeed urgent public interest.
That children do not fit comfortably in androgynous labor markets has become com-
monplace in recent years. Nobody doubts that the pressures and attractions of expand-
ing markets have contributed to the dramatic decline of birth rates in recent decades. 
A family that sells, or must sell, 3,400 “person hours” a year to the labor market has 
less time to devote to children than one that sells only 1,700 hours. The new social-
democratic orthodoxy, where social democracy increasingly includes liberal as well 
as conservative parties, is public provision of childcare together with a wide variety 
of other public services, subsidies and incentives designed to make high labor market 
6 Coincident with the sexual revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s, whose traces can be 
found in the rising divorce rates, it became commonplace to ridicule the “golden watch” em-
ployers would award workers when they retired from lifetime service. Its place was taken by the 
“golden handshake” paid upon dismissal.
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participation of women compatible with a high, or at least higher, birth rate (Esping-
Andersen 2009; Kröhnert et al. 2008). Various reasons are given for why female em-
ployment must be maintained and indeed increased, ranging from modern women, if 
forced to choose, preferring the freedom of paid employment over life-long bondage 
to children; to women being compelled by new family structures to earn a living for 
themselves; to commodifying labor market policies; the disappearance of family wages; 
increasing consumption standards; and an alleged general need to raise overall labor 
market participation in order to overcome bottlenecks in the labor supply or secure the 
continued funding of the welfare state. 
Whatever the case may be, we can observe that the physical reproduction of society, 
long considered a family matter, is rapidly becoming socialized, or nationalized, in a 
number of countries – as we will see, at high public expense. Here, too, the principle 
that seems to be at work is that as markets penetrate into social relations and strategic 
utility-maximizing replaces traditional norm-following, gaps emerge in the social fabric 
that call for political compensation unless a society is prepared to live with them. Like 
Danish labor market policy, the new family policies in continental European countries 
are intended to neutralize the negative side effects of increased flexibility on social life, 
not only in the case of employment but also in that of family relations. A return to less 
flexibility, in labor markets or families, is advocated only rarely: Easy divorce and legal 
abortion are politically sacrosanct,7 and an expansion of employment rights or a return 
to family wages are economically unrealistic. Almost as a matter of course, the state is 
expected to maintain, at public expense, an infrastructure that facilitates the expansion 
of market relations and compensates for its social dysfunctions. Here as elsewhere, as 
rational individualism takes the place of social obligation, states are coming under pres-
sure to provide collective remedies for the demise of traditional cultural norms and 
normative restraints. 
Policy measures aimed at increasing birth rates are not limited to the expansion of free 
childcare. Governments fear, probably rightly, that childcare alone will not be enough to 
induce prosperous middle class families in particular, who are used to advanced levels 
of time-consuming consumption, to accept the sacrifices of income and leisure that 
come with having children. Several European countries have therefore instituted or are 
devising new social policies that involve extensive cash transfers to parents, in particular 
double-career families in, still, stable employment. The idea is to replace a significant 
share of one of the parents’ income during a significant span of time after the birth of 
a child, so as to make the loss of income associated with caring for a small child – ide-
ally until it can be turned over to a public childcare center – less painful. Although the 
distributional effects of such policies are highly degressive, as high-income couples re-
7 Contemporary efforts at social engineering undertake to re-educate fathers to share responsi-
bility for child-rearing. However, introducing a cooling-off period in divorce proceedings for 
couples with small children is deemed too intrusive on individual freedom and seems in any 
case politically infeasible.
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ceive higher benefits than low-income earners or the unemployed, public concern with 
demography has become strong enough in a variety of countries to generate support 
for them even among social-democratic parties (see the discussions of Sweden and Ger-
many below). Across the political spectrum, the conviction is spreading that in contem-
porary societies, spontaneous reproduction is no longer enough, and that having and 
raising children cannot any more be left to families – or what is left of them – and must 
become a public responsibility if it is to happen at all.
For some time now, claims have been made that the new social policies are beginning 
to be effective and that there are first indications of a turnaround in fertility trends in 
market societies. The OECD, the leading advocate of labor market flexibility and female 
employment, reports that since the mid-1980s, the correlation coefficient between total 
fertility and female labor market participation rates in OECD member countries has 
turned positive, from –.50 in 1970s to +.58 in 1995 (Ahn/Mira 2002). However, there 
are good reasons to take this with more than just a grain of salt. Looking at our seven 
countries, we find that total fertility has increased only slightly in the past decade or two, 
if at all (Figure 8). Apart from in the United States and, perhaps, France, fertility is still 
far from having returned to replacement level, which most countries still exceeded in 
1970. Pending further examination, this seems to suggest that the reversal in the direc-
tion of the correlation between female labor market participation and fertility may have 
been due, not to an increase in fertility in countries with high female employment and 
few children, but to a continuing decline in fertility in countries with low labor market 
participation of women and, in the past, many children. Further down, I will discuss a 
possible explanation for this relationship.
More detailed inspection of our sample of seven countries confirms that matters are far 
from simple. In particular, it casts doubt on the optimistic expectation that the effects 
of increased commodification of labor on the physical reproduction of society can eas-
ily be compensated by political intervention. In 1970 just as in 2005, Germany ranked 
low, and the U.S. and the UK high, on both female employment and fertility. Sweden 
Table 5 Female employment and fertility, 1970 and 2005: Seven countries
Total fertility rate
low high
Female labor market 
participation rate
low
Germany 1970 (47/2.03)
Germany 2005 (67/1.34)
Japan 2005 (61/1.26)
Italy 2005 (50/1.32)
France 1970 (47/2.48)
← Italy 1970 (29/2.43)
France 2005 (64/1.92)
high
Japan 1970 ↑ (53/2.13)
Sweden 1970 → (59/1.94)
U.S.A. 1970 (49/2.48)
UK 1970 (47/2.43)
UK 2005 (70/1.79)
Sweden 2005 (78/1.77)
U.S.A. 2005 (69/2.05)
Source: own calculations.
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and Japan were high on employment and low on fertility, and Italy and France low on 
employment and high on fertility (Table 5). All in all, no relationship between the two 
variables was in evidence. In 2005, however, there was, as countries were either low 
(Germany, Italy, Japan) or high (Sweden, the UK, the United States) on both variables, 
the only exception being France, due to the country’s generally low rate of economic 
activity. That the non-correlation of 1970 was transformed into an almost perfect posi-
tive correlation 35 years later was due to the fact that three countries had changed cells: 
Japan, with a slower increase in labor market participation than the other countries; 
Italy, due to a precipitous decline in fertility accompanying a doubling of its participa-
tion rate – which was originally very low and still is relatively low – and Sweden, which 
further increased its already high participation rate of 1970 accompanied by a moderate 
decline in fertility. 
In any case, refusing to live with the social problems caused by a market economy may 
be expensive. In 2005, the high-fertility countries of Sweden, the UK and France spent 
3 percent and more of their GDP on family-related social policy programs (Table 6).8 
Japan and Italy, by comparison, where fertility is low, spent only 0.8 and 1.3 percent. 
In the off-cells, as it were, we find the United States with high fertility and even lower 
spending than Japan (0.6 percent) and Germany with low fertility and – moderately – 
high spending (2.2 percent). I will discuss these two cases shortly.
Expenditure on family policy appears to be highly correlated with spending on labor 
market policy (Table 6). Countries that spend highly on programs to moderate the 
social impact of markets, such as France, Sweden and Germany, devote between 5 and 
6 percent of their GDP to the two policy areas combined. Japan and the United States, 
by comparison, largely abstain from intervention and leave it to firms and families, and 
the forces of the market themselves, to take care of the social dysfunctions of market 
expansion. Countries that relieve firms and families of social obligations by socializing 
some of their traditional functions – like the provision of employment security or the 
8 More research is needed to determine to what extent the British figure includes spending on 
general antipoverty measures dressed up as support for families (see the discussion of the 
American case below). Generally, much fine-tuning has yet to be done in order to establish the 
exact comparability of national accounts of family as well as labor market policy expenditures.
Table 6 Combined spending on family and labor market policy,  
in percent of GDP, 2005
 Family policy Labor market policy Total
France 3.0 2.5 5.5
Germany  2.2 3.2 5.4
Italy 1.3 1.4 2.7
Japan 0.8 0.7 1.5
Sweden 3.2 2.5 5.7
UK 3.2 0.6 3.8
U.S.A. 0.6 0.3 0.9
Source: OECD Statistics on Social Expenditure; OECD Statistics on Labour Market Programmes.
26 MPIfG Working Paper 09/ 13
rearing of children – make life cheaper for market participants and thereby enhance 
their competitiveness. At the same time, as they convert private obligations into public 
ones and thereby monetarize them, they become increasingly cash-hungry since they 
run up public expenses which need to be covered by taxes or borrowing or both. Coun-
tries like France – and, even more so, Sweden and other Nordic countries – are under 
pressure to maintain tax regimes that extract for public purposes a significant share of 
the income of firms and, even more so, of citizens. At a time of advancing economic in-
ternationalization, when markets are expanding beyond national boundaries, this may 
become increasingly difficult, even in Sweden. Here, high taxation has long been almost 
self-sustaining, due to the fact that it funds an extraordinarily high level of public em-
ployment, which creates a powerful constituency of well-organized public sector em-
ployees who are highly motivated to lobby for high public spending.9
The Swedish case is instructive for yet another reason. Today, Sweden’s total fertility 
rate, at 1.77, is at the same level as in 1975, which is of course far below the rate of re-
placement. The rate declined in the 1970s when it fell to 1.68 in 1980; it recovered dur-
ing the next decade to reach 2.14 in 1990, and declined again sharply in the subsequent 
decade of liberalization, to 1.55 in 2000. More research will be needed to determine 
how changes in public spending on family policy were related to the ups and downs in 
total fertility. Nevertheless, upon inspection, Swedish efforts to make high female labor 
market participation compatible with high fertility appear less effective than they are 
sometimes made out to be, given the additional fact that very high spending on fami-
lies is complemented by highly regulated, family-friendly employment conditions in 
the public sector, with extensive job protection and generous entitlements to maternity 
leave and other benefits. If anywhere in the Western world, it was in the Swedish public 
sector that the general movement toward employment flexibility was checked by effec-
tively organized employees and their allies in government, defending worker and fami-
ly-friendly employment and working conditions against pressures for liberalization. 
9 A constituency that is characteristically “gendered.” Unlike the United States and the UK, high 
employment among Swedish women is largely public sector employment – just as employment 
in the Swedish public sector is overwhelmingly female. Swedish-style “state feminism” is some-
times caricatured as women dropping their children at a public childcare center to rush to work 
at another public childcare center where they take care of the children of the women taking care 
of their children. Be this as it may, state feminism places at least one person in every household 
who has a strong personal interest in the government’s ability to pay for a large public work-
force. Note that Torben Iversen, in a recent paper, suggests that continental European resistance 
to a Nordic-type welfare state with high rates of taxation might weaken “if women begin to 
think seriously about their options outside of marriage” (2009).
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5 The United States: Low spending, high fertility
As already noted, the United States, and perhaps also the United Kingdom,10 represent 
an alternative path to high fertility that differs profoundly from the French and the 
Nordic approaches – one that works at very low cost to the state, although its social 
costs may be high. The United States stands out as a country that refuses to collectiv-
ize, or socialize, the costs of physical reproduction to compensate for the pressures or 
attractions of markets, just as it is reluctant generally to accept collective responsibility 
for the externalities of expanding markets. As it turns out, this is not at all detrimental 
to national fertility. In fact, the U.S. has by far the highest fertility rate in our sample, 
despite of the absence of public spending on family support and against the odds not 
just of high female labor market participation, but also of very long working hours, ex-
treme flexibility of employment, and almost no public entitlements to job protection or 
maternity leave. All of this makes the United States the polar opposite of Sweden. 
How does the United States combine very high labor market flexibility with very high 
birth rates? In stark contrast to Sweden and France, the American solution is a free 
market one: to remedy the adverse side effects of the free play of market forces on social 
performance, it relies on more market forces. American fertility thrives on high social 
and economic inequality, as brought about by free markets and reinforced by extensive 
immigration, especially the illegal immigration of low-skilled workers. High income 
differentials, as are characteristic of unregulated labor markets, enable the gainfully em-
ployed and increasingly homogamous middle class to pay for private childcare. At the 
same time, inequality makes for an ample supply of cheap labor, in particular women 
from poor families who are often immigrants working illegally. Societies with high in-
equality are divided, or segregated, not least between those who can afford private ser-
vices and those who have no choice but to offer them at competitive market prices. (This 
is, in part, what is often referred to as a “service economy.”) Where market pressures 
are strong enough, time-pressured two-income couples can, and in fact have to, avail 
themselves not only of commercialized childcare, but also of commercialized cleaning, 
cooking, counseling and even shopping, replacing an ever-growing share of what used 
to be transactions within families based on reciprocity with monetarized market trans-
actions between strangers (Hochschild 1997, 2003). Poverty furthermore contributes to 
high birth rates in that the poor, in addition to being available to care for the children 
of the well-to-do, have many children themselves, due to lack of opportunity in labor 
markets, to traditional ways of life imported from their countries of origin, or both. If 
their children later fail to meet the demands of a high-technology “knowledge society” 
because of lack of parental support and an overburdened and underperforming public 
school system, they are welcome to replenish the low-wage service sector as emerging 
needs for highly-qualified labor can easily be filled by – this time legal – immigration at 
the upper end of the social spectrum.
10 See footnote 9.
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6 Germany: High spending, low fertility
The German welfare state has long been known for its inefficiency, with high spending 
producing poor results. One example of this is labor market policy, where Germany 
spends more than most other countries (cf. Table 6) and still suffers from comparatively 
high unemployment. This is often explained by the fact that the German welfare state 
is heavy on transfers and weak on services, not only because public services are difficult 
to organize in a federal state but also because of a historical impasse between Catholic 
subsidiarity and social-democratic statism. That impasse tends to force governments 
to serve two constituencies and their different political philosophies at the same time, 
doubling the costs of political intervention and preventing the bundling of scarce re-
sources for one coherent approach. 
Low fertility came to be recognized as a political problem under the second Schröder 
government (2002–2005) and attained prominent status under the Grand Coalition 
that followed it. Driven by the concerns of employers as well as social policy makers 
over low labor market participation among women, and pressured by a new genera-
tion of female voters in urban areas, the Christian Democrats essentially adopted the 
social-democratic approach, which largely followed the Scandinavian one. Expansion 
of public childcare to cover all one to three-year-olds will, however, take time and it is 
not clear, given the precarious condition of public finances, who will be able to pay for 
it (Streeck 2007). Moreover, traditionalist defenders of familialism, with their strong 
base in the CDU/CSU, demand that families that raise their children at home, with just 
one or no parent in employment, be given cash transfers equivalent to the average cost 
of public daycare provision. Eventually, the government introduced a transfer program 
for couples with two jobs that replaces two-thirds of one parent’s net income if he or 
she stays at home for up to a year after the birth of a child (Elterngeld). Benefits increase 
with income foregone, up to a cutoff point of € 1,800 a month. Elterngeld is paid for two 
more months if the second parent, usually the father, devotes at least two of the then 14 
months of government-paid leave to full-time childcare. 
Although the new transfer program is funded in part by cuts in subsidies to low-income 
families with children,11 and benefits increase with income, the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) has unambiguously supported it. To an extent, this may have been because of 
its feminist appeal, which lies in the use of economic incentives to persuade fathers to 
expose themselves to first-hand experience in caring for small children. But this cannot 
explain why the SPD did not object to the new family policy’s middle-class bias, which 
it undoubtedly would have done only a few years earlier. Indications are that under-
neath the surface of the public discourse – suppressed as yet but already virulent – lies a 
widely understood ethnic and classist subtext, in particular a deep-seated concern over 
11 Elterngeld replaces an older transfer program, Erziehungsgeld, which excluded middle- and 
high-income households and paid low-income families a maximum of € 7,200 per child, with 
benefits declining with income.
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the fact that a growing share of the children born in Germany, as in other European 
countries, are born to immigrant families or to women from the lower classes who have 
little education and, supposedly, intelligence.12 Such women are increasingly believed to 
have children only because they have no opportunities in the labor market, or because 
they prefer to live on transfer payments.13 Moreover, their children are considered to 
be the problem youths – and, later, the unemployed workers – of the future. To avoid a 
demographic degeneration of domestic human capital and the economic problems that 
are feared to come with it, even blatantly degressive distributive policies seem to be ac-
ceptable today if they promise to motivate the production of “high-quality” children by 
couples with high intelligence, academic training and good working habits.
Almost two years into the new cash transfers compensating double-earner families 
for income lost by taking time off to care for a newborn child, the desired increase in 
the number of middle-class babies has yet to materialize. Immigrants still have much 
higher birth rates than indigenous Germans, although exact numbers are hard to come 
by since naturalized citizens are not counted as immigrants. Moreover, German women 
with limited labor market opportunities and unfavorable consumption prospects con-
tinue to choose motherhood comparatively frequently as a traditional alternative to 
participation in employment. Inevitably, this increases the percentage of children in 
Germany, still a rich country, that live in poverty. Given the new flexibility of families as 
well as of employment, it also adds to the number of single mothers entitled to social 
benefits in spite of the new labor market policies of “activation,” especially if a woman 
has more than one child and no affordable childcare is available. While the government 
and the public still consider it urgent that something be done to alleviate child poverty, 
there are also rising suspicions that higher benefits for children and mothers, even if 
they are far lower than the benefits paid to the middle class, may make women produce 
children as a way of securing an income and not having to look for employment at, in-
evitably, low wages. Here, something like the “welfare mothers” debate in the U.S. may 
be in the offing, if not in the context of social policy, then in that of family policy and 
of the still latent but nonetheless widely popular distinction between high-quality and 
problem children.14
12 In 2008, 81 percent of German women between 35 and 49 years who had no occupational 
qualifications had at least one child. For women with a university degree this was true for only 
66 percent.
13 While in the middle of the current decade, 91 percent of women with low incomes (less than 
€ 10,000) had children, the respective figure for women with high incomes (above € 40,000) 
was only 60 percent. More than two-thirds of households earning less than € 2,000 per month 
reported an increase in household income after birth of a child, while two-thirds of households 
with an income above € 3,000 reported income losses.
14 It is impossible to explore the full complexity of the politics of this matter here. One facet is the 
future of the public school system. Among the reasons why the German middle class seems to 
defend segregated schooling today more passionately than ever – in particular, the distinction 
between Gymnasium and Hauptschule – is that in comprehensive schools, their children would 
now be a dwindling minority compared to children from immigrant and lower-class families. 
Concern over the changed and further changing composition of the young generation would 
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Will there be more middle-class children once the public childcare system is fully in 
operation (if it ever is)? Of course, even an increase in fertility to the Swedish level (i.e., 
based on 2005 figures, from 1.34 to 1.77; Table 6) would be far from bringing German 
birth rates back to replacement level. Moreover, there are good reasons to doubt that 
under the conditions of normal capitalism, public policy and social engineering can 
offer sufficiently effective compensation for the pressures and attractions of markets. 
The high-stress life of full-time working parents in a tightly organized and highly com-
petitive society like Germany, with its increasingly flexible labor markets, was recently 
depicted vividly in a study commissioned by the Adenauer Foundation, a policy think-
tank associated with the Christian Democratic Party (Merkle/Wippermann 2008). The 
picture that emerges is that life for the market can be quite consuming, of time as well 
as energy. Weekend partnerships and long-distance commuting – which have become 
quite frequent in today’s unisex labor markets – are clearly not conducive to having 
children. Nor is the risk of poverty associated with divorce and subsequent single par-
enthood. The same holds true for delayed formation of families because of uncertain 
employment prospects and low income – or, at the other end of the spectrum, the at-
tractions of a professional career and advanced consumption. There also is the decline 
in individual autonomy that comes with parenthood and partnership, which must ap-
pear all the more threatening after the transition from the petty-bourgeois lifestyle of 
the postwar generation to the petty-bohemian way of life of the generation of the 1970s 
and later.
In many ways, Germany, like probably a number of other countries too, seems uncom-
fortably poised somewhere in the middle between the United States and Sweden, as 
well as between Christian-democratic familialism and social-democratic statism. Un-
less immigration and the dualization of German labor markets continue unabated for 
another decade – which they might – the supply of low-wage labor along the lines of the 
American pattern may never be sufficient to enable middle-class parents to purchase 
the private services they would require for market-based relief from the double duty of 
work and child-rearing. However, an extension of employment protection and, in par-
ticular, public sector employment similar to the Swedish model, which would also make 
work and family easier to combine, seems even less likely. Most women in Germany, as 
in most other countries outside Scandinavia, work in the private sector, where the trend 
has been and continues to be toward flexibility rather than security. Movement in the 
Swedish direction would amount not to the further commodification of labor, but to a 
return to decommodification – to less rather than more flexibility – which was clearly 
not the idea when postwar capitalism began to liberate itself from the constraints of the 
standard employment relationship.15
perhaps abate if the middle class, like their counterparts in most urban centers of the United 
States, were to opt out of the public school system and send their children to private schools.
15 That the key to combining high fertility with high female employment may lie in the conditions 
of employment, and only to a much lesser extent in the provision of childcare, might be a lesson 
we could learn from the former GDR. In 1965, fertility rates began a steep decade-long decline 
in both East and West Germany, and were in fact practically identical for the two countries. 
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7 Winding up the family
A final facet of the complex relationship between labor market flexibility, family struc-
ture and fertility is that today’s birth rates covary strongly, and strongly positively, with 
the rate of single motherhood at birth. In fact, if there is any one influence that, in 
our sample of seven, accounts for high fertility, it is not high government spending 
on family policy but the rate of illegitimacy (Table 7). This holds true across both the 
free-market Anglo-American countries and the state-feminist countries of France and 
Sweden. No such relationship existed in 1970.16 Moreover, when we plot the increase in 
illegitimacy between 1970 and 2005 against the decline in fertility during the same pe-
riod, we find that the number of children declined least in countries where giving birth 
outside formal marriage was or was becoming more common (Figure 9). 
Childbirth outside marriage indicates less formally institutionalized – and, one would 
think – less stable and secure family relationships.17 Illegitimacy is likely to have differ-
ent meanings for lower-class and middle-class women, particularly in a country with 
a polarized social structure like the United States In the lower classes, men may be his-
While in West Germany they remained low, however, in East Germany they increased sharply 
beginning in 1975, from about 1.5 to about 2.0 five years later. This was clearly in response to a 
government program that offered mothers long periods of fully paid leave in case of childbirth 
and an unlimited and unconditional right to return to their former jobs. Leave periods could be 
combined ad libitum as more children were born. In addition, families could pay back sizeable 
government loans by having a certain number of children (a practice that came to be referred 
to, in untranslatable German, as “abkindern”). Although East German fertility slowly declined 
again in the 1980s, it remained above the West German level until unification. Thereafter, with 
employment having become endlessly more “flexible,” East German fertility rates dropped far 
below the West German level for an entire decade, even though childcare facilities continue to 
be in abundant supply in the East for traditional reasons.
16 At that time, Italy and Japan, where almost no children were born outside of marriage, had high 
or medium-high birth rates whereas Sweden, with a very high rate of illegitimacy by the stan-
dards of the period (18.6 percent), had the lowest fertility rate of the seven countries (which at 
1.94 was above the country’s current, relatively high fertility rate).
17 Countries with low illegitimacy (Italy and Japan) also have low divorce rates. The United States 
has medium-high illegitimacy combined with very high rates of divorce.
Table 7 Rates of unmarried parenthood in percent, by family policy 
spending and total fertility rates, 2005
Total fertility
low high
Low spending
Japan (2.0)
Italy (15.4)
U.S.A. (36.8)
High spending Germany (29.2)
UK (42.9)
France (48.4)
Sweden (55.5)
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torically or culturally unwilling to make lasting commitments to a wife, whereas in the 
middle class of today women as well as men may prefer their personal independence. 
Furthermore, while in the lower classes men may be unable to support a family eco-
nomically, middle-class women may no longer be in need of male economic support, 
as entering the labor market has enabled them to live, and even raise children, on their 
own. In any case, the evidence clearly seems to refute the Polanyian conjecture that less 
stable family structures should deter women from having children. In fact, today the 
opposite seems to be true: Societies that expect women to enter into a formally institu-
tionalized family relationship before having a child – societies which still cling to what 
is now called “familialism”– may be putting up too high a threshold for having children, 
for which they pay with comparatively low birth rates. Unlike in the 1960s, women at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century have more children in countries where cultur-
al norms and social, economic and legal conditions enable them to have them outside 
of formal marriage and, if necessary, bring them up as single mothers. 
The policy implications of this would seem to be profound. Whatever new forms of 
social stability and security a society may want to provide to its members in order to 
increase its birth rate, they cannot be conditioned on the restoration of traditional rela-
tions of solidarity within traditional families. Very likely, they must contribute to their 
further erosion.18 After the cultural sea change of the 1970s, a growing number of wom-
18 This seems to be the fundamental problem of Christian-democratic family policy – and the most 
important difference between family policies in countries like Germany, Italy and Japan on the 
Figure 9 Decline in fertility by increase in illegitimacy, 1970–2005
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en in today’s more individualistic societies obviously find it easier or are more willing 
to have children by themselves than to enter into formal marriage. In societies where 
having a child is normally expected to be preceded by marriage – as it apparently still 
is in Italy and Japan – women who do not get married, for lack of a willing and suit-
able partner or because they want to maintain their independence, remain more or less 
voluntarily without children. Across a wide range of countries, marriage seems to have 
become a commitment that is increasingly difficult for women to make – and, as indi-
cated by rising rates of illegitimacy, increasingly more difficult than bringing up a child 
outside marriage. This is especially true in social environments where childbirth “out of 
wedlock” is no longer socially disapproved of and is in fact supported by government 
policies, for example through broad provision of childcare and generous child allow-
ances. Countries that want to raise their birth rates, that is to say, can no longer afford to 
wait for men to be willing to become husbands, or for women to become wives; instead 
they must find ways to make reproduction independent from this happening. This re-
quires a social policy that offers encouragement not to the formation of families, but to 
single motherhood, by making it possible for women to combine having children, not 
just with a job, but also with the individualistic way of life for the sake of which many 
of them have chosen to enter the labor market in the first place. 
8 More market, more state?
Mending the holes advancing markets have torn in the fabric of mutual obligations and 
social solidarity inherited from precapitalist traditions or from organized capitalism 
can be expensive.19 Employment and family relations seem to be subject to the same 
logic in this respect, and so are, apparently, relations of credit. Where rational egoism 
is allowed or indeed invited to supersede traditional social obligations of employers to 
provide workers with security in addition to pay, and society is not willing to live with 
the consequences, political restoration of solidarity requires high public spending on 
labor market policy to compensate workers for their loss of industrial or organizational 
status. Furthermore, if societies consider their physical reproduction important, even 
though family obligations have been destabilized by the pressures and attractions of 
markets, unpaid informal labor inside families must be replaced with paid labor, either 
in the private sector or, if the conditions and consequences of this are unwelcome, in 
the public sector. Similarly, in the 2008/2009 financial crisis, when the erosion of tra-
ditional restraints on profit maximization in the money-making industry undermined 
creditors’ confidence in the capacity of debtors to live up to obligations engineered with 
the help of ever more complex financial technologies, the state had to take promises of 
one hand and Sweden, where the bourgeois family was dispensed with early on, on the other.
19 A similar argument has recently been developed by Jens Beckert, in a paper felicitously titled 
“Die Anspruchsinflation des Wirtschaftssystems” (2009).
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repayment that had become “toxic” upon itself, at enormous expense, and restore the 
functioning of money markets by deploying its unique resource, public authority, to 
assume the role of society’s debtor of last resort.
The exact mechanism by which markets may become materially demanding on societ-
ies has yet to be spelled out. Apparently as markets expand, traditional solidarity em-
bedded in informal social relations is eroded, often resulting in governments trying to 
replace it with formally instituted solidarity, or social obligations, through legal regula-
tion. Further progress of marketization, however, tends to weaken the legitimacy and 
effectiveness also of formal institutions as well. As employers clamor for the right to 
fire workers more freely, and husbands and wives for the right to fire each other, gov-
ernments come under pressure to liberalize regulatory regimes and soften whatever 
obligations they may have instituted to strengthen or replace embedded solidarity. At 
this point, governments may find themselves facing demands to replace instituted reci-
procity with state-provided, or socialized,20 solidarity – deploying their policy-making 
powers to provide society with substitutes for functions an increasingly market-driven 
social structure can no longer perform. As social solidarity becomes a matter of state 
provision, it typically becomes monetarized and requires public money.
The paradoxical conclusion seems to be that the spread of markets may give rise to 
growing demands for public support and political intervention, in the form of a transfer 
of an ever-growing number of social functions from informal relations of “embedded” 
mutual obligation to public institutions and, finally, public services, provided that and 
as long as a society refuses to submit itself completely to the “free play of market forces.” 
As we have seen, however, the costs to public budgets of neutralizing the socially desta-
bilizing effects of markets may be substantial, and indeed puzzles and contradictions 
abound in the policies and politics of reconstructive state intervention. For example, 
increases in regional mobility in labor markets and in female labor market participa-
tion, as promoted by OECD governments today, are not easily compatible with families 
assuming responsibility for caring for the growing number of elderly, which govern-
ments also promote. As labor markets become more flexible, pressures for care for the 
elderly to be provided publicly inevitably arise. Another case is the recent decision by 
the German Constitutional Court restoring an expensive tax benefit for commuters 
(the Pendlerpauschale) that the Grand Coalition had terminated in its effort to balance 
public spending. While the government could have passed fresh legislation to overrule 
the court, it realized that cutting the benefit was difficult to combine with a labor mar-
ket policy requiring workers to commute over long distances if employment near their 
home was not available.
In a capitalist market society, an obvious way of funding public spending to compensate 
for the destructive side-effects of marketization is further marketization and commodi-
fication of social relations, which causes the money economy and with it the tax base to 
20 The German word, of course, is verstaatlicht; unfortunately it has no equivalent in English.
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grow. For example, increasing women’s participation in the labor market seems to be 
the only way in Germany today to secure the public revenue needed to keep the social 
security system afloat. Like a vicious circle, however, the cure may exacerbate the disease 
in that it adds to the problems that social policy must address. In fact, a now frequently-
asked question is how long the states of social-democratic capitalism will continue to 
be able to foot the bill for the reconstructive interventions that are expected of them, 
especially when public debt finally assumes the astronomic dimensions that it can be 
expected to assume once the current financial crisis is over. 
In recent years, family policy was the big growth item in public budgets, along with edu-
cation, where much money was spent, with little overall success, on adapting schools to 
a new type of family lacking the time or the skills to offer much assistance to children 
and teachers. Today European governments are supposed to rescue not just banks from 
insolvency, but also children from the poverty associated with single parenthood or 
divorce. They also are to create incentives of all kinds for middle-class families to pro-
duce more offspring; to re-educate men to accept responsibility for their children; to 
provide meals at school to a growing number of children who do not receive meals at 
home because their parents are too busy or too poor or both – not to mention pressur-
ing mothers and fathers to participate in the labor market, if need be for very low wages 
supplemented, of course, out of public coffers. Clearly there is little reason to expect 
the state to disappear as markets become more market-like, and social structures more 
market-driven. But there is very good reason to ask whether and under what condi-
tions governments will continue to afford accepting responsibility for the growing costs 
to society of the private pursuit of advantage in ever freer markets. Is it as likely as it 
sometimes seems that as markets keep expanding, welfare states will eventually have to 
surrender and abandon the future of societies entirely to the logic of market relations?
References
Ahn, Namkee/Pedro Mira, 2002: A Note on the Changing Relationship Between Fertility and Female 
Employment Rates in Developed Countries. In: Journal of Population Economics 15, 667–682.
Berger, Suzanne/Michael Piore, 1980: Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies. Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Boltanski, Luc/Eve Chiapello, 2005: The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso.
Eichhorst, Werner/Eric Thode/Frank Winter, 2004: Benchmarking Deutrschland 2004. Berlin: Springer.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 2009: The Incomplete Revolution: Adapting to Women’s New Roles. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.
Glyn, Andrew, 2006: Capitalism Unleashed: Finance Globalization and Welfare. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Hochschild, Arlie Russell, 1997: The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work. 
New York: Henry Holt & Company.
——, 2003: The Commercialization of Intimate Life: Notes from Home and Work. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
36 MPIfG Working Paper 09/ 13
Iversen, Torben, 2009: Dualism and Political Coalitions: Inclusionary versus Exclusionary Reforms in 
an Age of Rising Inequality. Unpublished manuscript. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Judt, Tony, 2005: Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. London: Penguin.
Kröhnert, Steffen/Iris Hoßmann/Reiner Klingholz, 2008: Europe’s Demographic Future: Growing 
Regional Imbalances. Berlin: Berlin Institute for Population and Development.
Merkle, Tanja/Carsten Wippermann, 2008: Eltern unter Druck: Selbstverständnisse, Befindlichkeiten 
und Bedürfnisse von Eltern in verschiedenen Lebenswelten. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.
Polanyi, Karl, 1957[1944]: The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 
Boston: Beacon Press.
Streeck, Wolfgang, 1987: The Uncertainties of Management in the Management Uncertainty: Em-
ployers, Labour Relations and Industrial Adjustment in the 1980s. In: Work, Employment and 
Society 1, 281–308.
——, 2001: High Equality, Low Activity: The Contribution of the Social Welfare System to the Stabil-
ity of the German Collective Bargaining Regime. In: Industrial Relations 54(3), 698–706.
——, 2007: Endgame? The Fiscal Crisis of the German State. MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/7. Cologne: 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. <www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp07-7.pdf>
——, 2008a: Flexible Markets, Stable Societies? MPIfG Working Paper 08/6. Cologne: Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies. <www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp08-6.pdf>
——, 2008b: Industrial Relations Today: Reining in Flexibility. MPIfG Working Paper 08/3. Cologne: 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. <www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp08-3.pdf>
——, 2009: Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Viebrock, Elke/Jochen Clasen, 2009: Flexicurity and Welfare Reform: A Review. In: Socio-Economic 
Review 7(2), 305–331.
Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG
MPIfG Discussion Papers
DP 09/7
M. Höpner, A. Petring,  
D. Seikel, B. Werner
Liberalisierungspolitik: 
Eine Bestandsaufnahme 
von zweieinhalb Dekaden 
marktschaffender Politik in 
entwickelten Industrieländern
DP 09/6
B. Harrington
Trust and Estate Planning:  
The Emergence of a Profession 
and Its Contribution to Socio-
Economic Inequality
DP 09/5
J. S. Ahlquist, C. Breunig
Country Clustering in 
Comparative Political Economy
DP 09/4
H. Callaghan
Constrain-Thy-Neighbor 
Effects as a Determinant of 
Transnational Interest  
Group Cohesion
DP 09/3
D. Stark, B. Vedres
Opening Closure:
Intercohesion and 
Entrepreneurial Dynamics  
in Business Groups
DP 09/2
J. Beckert
Koordination und 
Verteilung: Zwei Ansätze der 
Wirtschaftssoziologie 
MPIfG Working Papers
WP 09/12
F. W. Scharpf
The Double Asymmetry of 
European Integration –
Or: Why the EU Cannot Be  
a Social Market Economy
WP 09/11
W. Streeck
Man weiß es nicht genau:  
Vom Nutzen der Sozialwissen-
schaften für die Politik
WP 09/10
J. Beckert
Die Anspruchsinflation des 
Wirtschaftssystems
WP 09/9
G. S. Schaal, C. Ritzi
Empirische Deliberations-
forschung
WP 09/8
P. Mair
Representative versus 
Responsible Government
WP 09/7
G. Möllering
Market Constitution Analysis:
A New Framework Applied 
to Solar Power Technology 
Markets
WP 09/6
M. Höpner
Parteigänger und Landschafts-
pfleger: Eine Analyse der 
Parteispenden großer 
deutscher Unternehmen, 
1984–2005
MPIfG Books
S. Freye
Führungswechsel: Die 
Wirtschaftselite und das Ende 
der Deutschland AG
Campus, 2009
C. Crouch/H. Voelzkow
Innovation in Local Economies: 
Germany in Comparative 
Context
Oxford University Press, 2009 
B. Rehder, T. von Winter.,  
U. Willems (Hg.)
Interessenvermittlung in 
Politikfeldern: Vergleichende 
Befunde der Policy- und 
Verbändeforschung
VS-Verlag, 2009 
K. van Kersbergen,  
P. Manow (eds.)
Religion, Class Coalitions,  
and Welfare States
Cambridge University Press, 
2009
C. Trampusch
Der erschöpfte Sozialstaat: 
Transformation eines 
Politikfeldes
Campus, 2009
M. Busemeyer
Wandel trotz Reformstau:  
Die Politik der beruflichen 
Bildung seit 1970
Campus, 2009
R. Mayntz
Sozialwissenschaftliches 
Erklären: Probleme der 
Theoriebildung und 
Methodologie
Campus, 2009
Ordering Information
MPIfG Discussion Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Books
At bookstores; abstracts on the MPIfG website.
www.mpifg.de
Go to Publications.
New Titles
Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa.
Das Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung 
ist eine Einrichtung der Spitzenforschung in den 
Sozialwissenschaften. Es betreibt anwendungsoffene 
Grundlagenforschung mit dem Ziel einer empirisch 
fundierten Theorie der sozialen und politischen 
Grundlagen moderner Wirtschaftsordnungen. 
Im Mittelpunkt steht die Untersuchung der Zu-
 sammen hänge zwischen ökonomischem, sozialem 
und politischem Handeln. Mit einem vornehmlich 
institutionellen Ansatz wird erforscht, wie Märkte 
und Wirtschaftsorganisationen in historisch-institu- 
tionelle, politische und kulturelle Zusammenhänge 
eingebettet sind, wie sie entstehen und wie sich ihre 
gesellschaftlichen Kontexte verändern. Das Institut 
schlägt eine Brücke zwischen Theorie und Politik und 
leistet einen Beitrag zur politischen Diskussion über 
zentrale Fragen moderner Gesellschaften.
The Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies 
conducts advanced basic research on the governance 
of modern societies. It aims to develop an empirically 
based theory of the social and political foundations  
of modern economies by investigating the interrelation 
between economic, social and political action. Using 
primarily an institutional approach, it examines how 
markets and business organizations are embedded 
in historical-institutional, political and cultural 
frameworks, how they develop, and how their social 
contexts change over time. The institute seeks to build 
a bridge between theory and policy and to contribute 
to political debate on major challenges facing modern 
societies.
